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Abstract
Health management of complex dynamic systems has
traditionally evolved separately from automated con-
trol, planning, and scheduling (generally referred to in
the paper as decision making). A goal of Integrated
System Health Management has been to enable coor-
dination between system health management and deci-
sion making, although successful practical implementa-
tions have remained limited. This paper proposes that,
rather than being treated as connected, yet distinct en-
tities, system health management and decision making
should be unified in their formulations. Enabled by ad-
vances in modeling and computing, we argue that the
unified approach will increase a system’s operational ef-
fectiveness and may also lead to a lower overall system
complexity. We overview the prevalent system health
management methodology and illustrate its limitations
through numerical examples. We then describe the pro-
posed unification approach and show how it accommo-
dates the typical system health management concepts.
1 Introduction
System Health Management (SHM) has evolved from sim-
ple red-line alarms and human-initiated responses to a dis-
cipline that often includes sophisticated modeling and auto-
mated fault recovery recommendations (Aaseng 2001). The
main goal of modern SHM has been defined as the preser-
vation of a system’s ability to function as intended (Ras-
mussen 2008; Johnson and Day 2011). While in this paper
we apply the term SHM to the operational phase of a sys-
tem’s lifespan, in other contexts the term may also encom-
pass design-time considerations (Johnson and Day 2011).
The actual achievement of a system’s operational objectives,
on the other hand, is under the purview of the fields of con-
trol, planning, and scheduling. In this paper, we will gen-
erally refer to all of the processes aimed at accomplishing
operational objectives as decision making (DM), while us-
ing the more specialized terms where necessary.
Historically, the field of SHM has developed separately
from DM. The typical SHM functions (monitoring, fault de-
tection, diagnosis, mitigation, and recovery) were originally
handled by human operators–and similarly for DM (Aaseng
2001; Ogata 2010). As simple automated control was be-
ing introduced for DM, automated fault monitors and alarms
reduced operator workload on the SHM side. Gradually,
more sophisticated control techniques were developed for
DM (Ogata 2010), while automated emergency responses
started handling some of the off-nominal system health con-
ditions (Rasmussen 2008). Capable automated planning and
scheduling tools eventually became available for performing
more strategic DM (Ghallab, Nau, and Traverso 2016). On
the SHM side, automated fault diagnosis was added, in some
cases coupled with failure prediction (i.e., prognostic) algo-
rithms (Lu and Saeks 1979), as well as with recovery proce-
dures (Avizienis 1976). Still, the two sides largely remained
separated. When the concept of Integrated System Health
Management became formalized, most interpretations of in-
tegrated encompassed some interactions between DM and
SHM, although practical implementations of such interac-
tions have been limited (Figueroa and Walker 2018).
This paper makes the following claims:
1. For actively controlled systems, prognostics is not mean-
ingful; for uncontrolled systems prognostics may only be
meaningful under a specific set of conditions;
2. DM should be unified with SHM for optimality and there
is a path for doing so;
3. Automated emergency response should be done sepa-
rately from unified DM/SHM, in order to provide perfor-
mance guarantees and dissimilar redundancy.
For the second claim, we intend to show a path towards
DM/SHM unification that builds on the latest developments
in state space modeling, planning, and control. While in
the past limitations in computing hardware and algorithms
would have made unified DM/SHM difficult, we believe that
the advances of the recent years make it an attainable goal.
We also believe that this unified approach is applicable to a
broad spectrum of DM, from traditional deterministic plan-
ners to complex algorithms computing long-horizon action
policies in the presence of uncertainty. We use the term uni-
fication to emphasize the idea of DM and SHM being done
within the same framework, rather than the two being inte-
grated as separate subsystems exchanging information.
Some initial progress towards DM/SHM unification can
be found in the earlier work by Balaban and Alonso (2013),
Balaban et al. (2018), and Johnson and Day (2010; 2011).
System health information was also incorporated into DM
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by others (Bethke, How, and Vian 2008; Ure et al. 2013;
Agha-mohammadi et al. 2014). This paper aims to introduce
a systematic view on such integration, discuss its benefits,
and illustrate how current SHM concepts map into the pro-
posed approach without a loss of functionality or generality.
The paper first defines the categories of systems that are
of interest to this study (Section 2) and then overviews the
prevailing approach to SHM (Section 3). The first claim (on
prognostics) is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
the second claim, concerning DM/SHM integration and its
benefits, as well as the rationale for the third claim (that
DM/SHM should be separate from automated emergency re-
sponse). Section 6 concludes.
2 Systems of interest
In the discussion to follow, we consider both uncontrolled
and controlled systems. For our purposes, the uncontrolled
systems category includes not only those systems types for
which control is not available or required, but also those
operating on predefined control sequences, such as indus-
trial robots performing the same sets of operations over
extended periods of time. Also included are system types
that can be considered uncontrolled within some time inter-
val of interest (decision horizon). Systems in this category
may have degradation modes that affect the system’s per-
formance within its expected useful life span. The rate of
degradation is influenced by internal (e.g., chemical decom-
position) and external factors (e.g., temperature of the op-
erating environment). In addition to aforementioned indus-
trial robots, examples of uncontrolled system types include
bridges, buildings, electronic components, and certain types
of rotating machinery, such as electrical power generators.
The controlled systems category covers all other system
types, including dynamically controlled systems operating
in uncertain environments, where the current state cannot
be fully observed and non-determinism is present in control
action outcomes. Degradation processes are influenced not
only by the same kinds of internal and external factors as for
the uncontrolled systems, but also by the control actions.
Most of the discussion to follow is applicable to both cate-
gories, although controlled systems would, naturally, benefit
more from active DM/SHM. In describing the systems, we
adopt the notation from the field of decision making under
uncertainty (Kaelbling, Littman, and Cassandra 1998).
A system state s can be a scalar or a vector belonging to
a state space S. A system action a initiates state transitions,
with A denoting the space of all available actions (A may be
state-dependent). A transition model T (s, a, s′) describes
the probability of transitioning to a particular state s′ ∈ S
as a result of taking action a from state s. A reward model
R(s, a) describes a positive reward obtained or a negative
cost incurred as a result of taking action a from state s. Ter-
minal states form a subset ST ⊂ S. Terminal states ST may
include both failure and goal states. Transitions from a ter-
minal state are only allowed back to itself.
If there is state uncertainty, belief states are used instead
of regular states (also referred to as beliefs). A belief b is a
probability distribution over S, with B denoting the space
of all beliefs. Observations (e.g., sensor readings) can help
with belief estimation and updating. Like a state, an ob-
servation can be a vector quantity. An observation model
O(s′, a, o) describes the probability of getting an observa-
tion o upon transition to state s′ as a result of action a.
The general function of decision making is to select ac-
tions. While in some systems we are only concerned with
selecting a single at at a given time t, decision making
problems often involve selecting a sequence of actions. In
a strictly deterministic system, an entire sequence of actions
(a plan) can be selected ahead of time. In systems with ac-
tion outcome uncertainty, however, a fixed plan can quickly
become obsolete. Instead, a policy pi(s) : S → A needs to
be selected that prescribes which action should be taken in
any state. If a policy is selected that, in expectation, opti-
mizes a desired metric (e.g., maximizes cumulative reward),
it is referred to as an optimal policy and denoted pi∗.
Throughout the paper, we use a robotic exploration rover
operating on the surface of the Moon as a running example
of a complex controlled system. The rover is solar-powered
and stores electrical energy in a rechargeable battery.
3 System Health Management
A typical contemporary SHM integration approach is shown
in Figure 1. A DM subsystem generates an action at,DM,
aimed at achieving the operational objectives. The plant exe-
cutes at,DM and an observation ot is generated and relayed to
both DM and SHM. DM computes at+1,DM on the basis of
ot, while SHM analyzes ot for indications of faults (defined
here as system states considered to be off-nominal) and, if
any are detected, issues a mitigation or recovery command
at+1,SHM either directly to the plant or as a recommendation
to the DM subsystem (Valasek 2012).
PlantDM SHM
Figure 1: A typical system architecture with SHM
Figure 2 goes into more detail on the SHM subsystem.
The fault detection module corresponds to the traditional
red-line monitors detecting threshold-crossing events of sen-
sor values, represented on the diagram by a Boolean fault
detection function F . If a fault is detected (F (ot) = true),
fault isolation and diagnosis (or identification) is per-
formed, generating a vector of fault descriptors ft (Daigle
and Roychoudhury 2010). Each fault descriptor typically
identifies a component, its fault mode, and its fault parame-
ters (Daigle and Roychoudhury 2010). There are diagnostic
systems that also include an estimated fault probability in
the descriptor (Narasimhan and Brownston 2007). If the un-
certainty of the diagnostic results is deemed too high (e.g.,
ft consists of only low-probability elements), uncertainty
management is sometimes performed in order to obtain a
better estimate of the current system condition (Lopez and
Sarigul-Klijn 2010).
Some recent SHM implementations then pass ft to a
prognostic module (Roychoudhury and Daigle 2011). In the
SHM context, the intended goal of the prognostic module is
prognosisdiagnosis/isolationfault detection mitigation/recovery
Figure 2: A typical contemporary SHM architecture
to predict, at time tp (here tp = t), whether and when faults
will lead to system failure (defined as inability to perform
its assigned function) within the window [tp, tp + H] of a
prediction horizon H (the terms prediction horizon and de-
cision horizon are equivalent for our purposes). In prognos-
tics literature, the time of failure is commonly synonymous
with the term end of [useful] life (EOL). Equivalently, the
goal of prognostics can be defined as predicting the sys-
tem’s remaining useful life (RUL). In Figure 2, the prog-
nostic prediction is represented as a probability distribution
p(EOL|ft) for EOL ∈ [tp, tp+H]. Uncertainty management
is sometimes also prescribed following prognostic analysis,
meant to improve the prediction if the confidence in it is in-
sufficiently high (Wang, Youn, and Hu 2012). Note that if
a prognostic module is part of an SHM sequence, the term
Prognostics and Health Management (PHM) is used by
some instead of SHM in order to emphasize the role prog-
nostics is playing in managing the system’s lifecycle.
Finally, p(EOL|ft) and ft are passed to the fault mitiga-
tion and recovery component to select an action at+1,SHM
from the action set ASHM, in order to mitigate or recover
from faults in ft. As part of this process, operational con-
straints may be set for those faulty components that cannot
be restored to nominal health. If functional redundancy ex-
ists for such components, their further use may be avoided.
The overall limitations of the current SHM approach are
discussed in Section 5, where an approach that unifies DM
and SHM is then proposed. The next section, however, fo-
cuses on the prognostic component and discusses why it is
not meaningful for actively controlled systems and is chal-
lenging to implement in a useful manner for uncontrolled
systems.
4 Prognostics
A general definition of prognostics is that of a process
predicting the time of occurrence of an event E (Daigle,
Sankararaman, and Kulkarni 2015). Using notation from
Section 2, if φE : S → B (where B , {0, 1}) is an
event threshold function, then tE , inf{t ∈ [tp, tp + H] :
φE(st) = 1} is the nearest predicted time of E (st is
the state at time t). If the state evolution trajectory is non-
deterministic, then p(tE |s0:tp) is computed instead. If states
cannot be directly observed, p(tE |o0:tp) is computed. As de-
fined, prognostics is only meaningful in a specific set of cir-
cumstances and next we use two examples to illustrate why.
4.1 Uncontrolled systems
There are two main desirable, interrelated attributes for a
prognostic system: (1) low uncertainty in EOL estimation,
so that a decision about mitigation or recovery actions can be
made with confidence, and (2) the ability to make a predic-
tion far enough in advance for the actions to be successfully
executed. For uncontrolled systems, this means that prog-
nostics is primarily useful for systems with long lifetimes,
low process uncertainty, or both. To illustrate why this is the
case, we start with a simple uncontrolled system example:
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 200
1
time
he
al
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Figure 3: Uncontrolled system prognostics (Example 1)
Example 1. At time t = 0, the health state of a sys-
tem is s0 = 1 (states are scalar). According to a de-
terministic model, the nominal health degradation rate is
constant at s˙n = 0.05/∆t, where ∆t is the prediction
time step, selected as the minimum time interval within
which a change in the system’s health is expected to be
detectable. A stochastic model predicts the probability of
the nominal degradation rate s˙n within any time step as
pn = 0.8 and the probability of a higher degradation rate
(s˙h = s˙n + /∆t) as ph = 0.2. Assume  = 0.05.
The objective for both models is to predict EOL, i.e.,
the smallest t for which s ≤ 0. For this example, the pre-
diction uncertainty is defined as σ(tp) = |E[EOLd(tp)]−
E[EOLs(tp)]|, i.e., the absolute difference between the
expected EOL values computed by the two models at a
prediction time tp. A requirement is set on the maximum
EOL prediction uncertainty as σmax = 1∆t.
For this example, let us assume that the health state is
fully observable and define ρp = sp/s0, the fraction of full
health remaining at tp. In Figure 3, a prediction is shown to
be made at tp = t0, with sp = s0, ρp = 1, and H = 20∆t.
Since
E[EOLd(tp)] =
ρp
s˙n
and E[EOLs(tp)] =
ρp
pns˙n + phs˙h
=
=
ρp
(1− ph)s˙n + ph(s˙n + /∆t) =
ρp
(s˙n + ph/∆t))
, then
σ =
∣∣∣∣ρps˙n − ρp(s˙n + ph/∆t)
∣∣∣∣ = ρp ∣∣∣∣20− 1(0.05 + ph)
∣∣∣∣∆t.
(1)
In the last equation, we substitute the value for the nom-
inal degradation rate s˙n in order to focus on the effects of
the degradation rate uncertainty. As can be seen in Figure 3,
EOL is reached by both models within the prediction hori-
zon. However, from Equation 1, σ = 3.33∆t > σmax.
For the requirement on σ to be satisfied, either ρp (health
fraction remaining), ph (the probability of deviations from
the nominal degradation rate),  (the magnitude of devia-
tions), or some combination of them needs to be reduced.
If ph and  are kept the same, with ρp = 0.25 we can get
σ = 0.83∆t. However, tp now needs to be ≈ 15∆t, with
only 5∆t left until failure (RUL). RUL corresponds to the
time available to either replace/repair the uncontrolled sys-
tem or initiate an emergency response. For a quickly degrad-
ing system with ∆t = 1 s, RUL would be only 5 s, which
is likely enough time for an emergency response, but not
for repair or replacement. In practice, in uncontrolled sys-
tems where handling a fast-developing degradation process
is important, estimating p(EOL) is unlikely to bring tangi-
ble benefits. For instance, if pressure starts building quickly
in a fuel tank of an ascending crewed rocket, the launch
abort system (emergency response) is likely to be activated
by the exceedance of a predefined pressure limit or pressure
increase rate (i.e., functions of fault detection). Computing
whether the tank breach will occur in 10 seconds or 12 sec-
onds will not materially influence that response. For uncon-
trolled systems with mid-range degradation rates (minutes,
hours, days), extrapolation of the degradation function may
be able to serve as part of a caution and warning mechanism.
What follows is that if degradation uncertainty is rela-
tively high or varies significantly over time, a short predic-
tion horizon (compared to the overall system lifetime) may
be necessary to limit the uncertainty propagation and result
in a usable σ. In this case, systems with longer lifetimes are
more suitable for applying prognostics. For example, if a
bridge failure can be predicted 3 years in advance with an
accuracy of ±1 year, that can still be a useful prediction.
However, while many uncontrolled systems can be clas-
sified as systems with long lifetimes, there exists a number
of fundamental practical difficulties in performing effective
prognostics for them. One of the primary issues stems di-
rectly from the typically long (often decades) lifetimes. In
order to establish trust in the degradation models, they need
to be adequately tested using long-term observations from
“normal use” degradation or observations from properly for-
mulated accelerated testing. With useful (from the statisti-
cal point of view) “normal use” degradation data sets being
rare for many long-life system types (Heng et al. 2009), ac-
celerated degradation efforts are common. If an accelerated
degradation regime is proposed, however, what needs to be
clearly demonstrated is that:
1. The regime can be used as a substitute for real-life
degradation processes. For instance, while Rigamonti et
al. (2016) and Celaya et al. (2011) use thermal and elec-
trical overstress to quickly degrade electrical capacitors
and predict the time of their failure (by using an empir-
ical equation), their work does not extend to making a
connection to real-life degradation, which takes place at
lower temperatures and voltage/current levels. Similar is-
sues are highlighted by Dao et al. (2006) for composite
materials, where mechanical, thermal, and chemical pro-
cesses result in complex interactions during aging.
2. There is a known mapping from the accelerated time-
line to the unaccelerated timeline. Oh et al. (2015) note
in an overview of condition monitoring and prognostics
of insulated gate bipolar transistors that while numerous
fatigue models have been constructed that predict cycles-
to-failure under repetitive cycle loading, they are not de-
signed to predict RUL under realistic usage conditions.
Although use of various fatigue analysis models, e.g.,
Paris, Gomez, and Anderson (1961), has been proposed
for estimating RUL on the basis of stress cycles, their ac-
curacy has proven difficult to confirm.
There are subfields of prognostics where accelerated ag-
ing regimes may be viable, such as in aircraft metallic struc-
tures or rotating machinery (where mechanical degradation
factors could be assumed dominant). However, the issue of
high uncertainty of degradation trajectories still arises, even
under the same test conditions (Virkler, Hillberry, and Goel
1979; Meng 1994). Finite element modeling may help al-
leviate degradation trajectory uncertainty in specific cases,
albeit at a significant computational cost (Heng et al. 2009).
Some of the other challenges with effective prognostics
for uncontrolled systems include the accuracy of estimating
the actual state of health, the effects of fault interactions, and
the effects of system maintenance actions (Heng et al. 2009).
If these challenges are successfully overcome and the fail-
ure mechanisms of a component are understood well enough
to develop useful degradation models, a different question
then arises: should the design or usage of the component be
changed to mitigate these mechanisms? While in some cases
this may not be feasible, in others it may be the simplest and
most reliable way of improving safety and maintenance re-
quirements (Bathias and Pineau 2013). A redesign or change
in usage would, on the other hand, make the degradation
models obsolete. The next tier of degradation modes would
then need to be analyzed and modeled, possibly followed
by another redesign. Thus analysis intended for the develop-
ment of degradation (prognostics) models instead becomes
part of the design cycle.
For those uncontrolled systems that are, in fact, suitable
for health management based on prognostics, the action
space is typically limited to: (a) no action, (b) replacement,
or (c) repair to a nominal operating condition. Even so, we
still propose that predictive analysis for these systems needs
to be driven by decision making requirements. For instance,
if domain knowledge informs that variability in system be-
havior beyond some health index value hmin is too great
for choosing actions with sufficiently high confidence, then
EOL can be redefined as hmin and system dynamics beyond
hmin need to be neither modeled nor computed during pre-
diction, potentially freeing computing resources for estimat-
ing system behavior up to hmin with more accuracy.
4.2 Controlled systems
As soon as dynamic control is introduced into the system
and uncertainty is taken into account, prognostics, as defined
above, and the PHM version of the process in Figure 2 are
no longer meaningful–for two key reasons. First, not having
the knowledge, at tp, of the future system actions, a PHM
algorithm will either (a) have to rely on some precomputed
plan to obtain atp+1:H for its predictive analysis (a plan that
can quickly become obsolete due to outcome uncertainty)
or (b) have to use a random policy (which can, for instance,
result in less optimal actions being considered as probable
as the more optimal ones). A random policy is also likely to
result in a greater state uncertainty throughout the [tp, tp +
H] interval. Second, the oft-proposed strategy of rerunning
prognostic analysis after an action, so that new information
can be taken into account (Tang et al. 2011), may not help.
Once a suboptimal execution branch has been committed to,
it may remain suboptimal regardless of future decisions. The
following example provides an illustration of these issues:
Example 2. A rover needs to traverse an area with no sun-
light, going around a large crater from waypoint wp0 to
the closest suitable recharge location at wp4. The battery
charge at wp0 is 1100 Wh.
There are three possible levels of terrain difficulty: dif-
ficult (requiring 600 Wh per drive segment), moderate
(300 Wh per segment), and easy (200 Wh per segment).
All drive segments are the same length. Probabilities of
terrain types in different regions are shown in Figure 4.
The rover can go to the left, wp0 → wp1 → wp4, or to
the right,wp0 → wp2 → wp4 (left and right are relative to
the diagram). If going to the right, it can decide to detour
around a smaller crater wp2 → wp3 → wp4 (easy terrain
with p = 1.0) instead of going directly wp2 → wp4.
200Wh (p = 1.0)
wp0
wp2
wp3
600Wh (p = 0.5)
Detour region:
300Wh (p = 0.5)
Right region:
wp1
wp4
600Wh (p = 0.4)
300Wh (p = 0.6)
Left region:
Figure 4: PHM vs. DM for a controlled system (Example 2)
s0
s1 s2 s3 s4
s7 s8 s9 s10s5 s6
(p=0.6) (p=0.5) (p=0.5)(p=0.4)
−600
−600−300
−300 −600 −300
−400 −300 −400−600
−100 500 −100 100 500 400
1100
a1 a2
a1 a2 a2a1
Figure 5: Execution scenarios in Example 2
A decision support PHM algorithm, running a sufficiently
large number of simulations, would consider two possi-
ble execution scenarios along the left route: (L1) etotal =
1200 Wh, p = 0.4 and (L2) etotal = 600 Wh, p = 0.6 (etotal
is the total energy consumed in a scenario). The expected en-
ergy consumption along the left route can then be computed
as E[etotal, L] = 1200 Wh · 0.4 + 600 Wh · 0.6 = 840 Wh.
The algorithm would then consider four possible exe-
cution scenarios along the right route (assuming uniform
random choice of action at wp3): (R1) etotal = 1200 Wh,
p = 0.25; (R2) etotal = 600 Wh, p = 0.25; (R3) etotal =
1000 Wh, p = 0.25; and (R4) etotal = 700 Wh, p = 0.25.
Then E[etotal, R] = (1200 + 600 + 1000 + 700) · 0.25 Wh =
875 Wh. With E[etotal, L] < E[etotal, R], the PHM algorithm
commits to the left path. Note that in many cases prognostics
algorithms generate even less information to support action
selection than what was done here (typically p(EOL) only).
A DM algorithm capable of sequential reasoning un-
der uncertainty (Kochenderfer 2015) would compute
E[etotal, L] = 840 Wh in the same manner as the PHM al-
gorithm, as there are no actions needing to be selected along
the left route after wp0. On the right side, however, the DM
algorithm can make an informed choice at wp2, based on
observations made along wp0 → wp2. This implies having
only two possible execution scenarios: (R1) if the terrain is
observed as difficult, the detour through wp3 is taken, and
(R2) if the terrain is observed as moderate, the rover goes
directly to wp4. For R1, etotal = 1000 Wh, p = 0.5. For
R2, etotal = 600 Wh, p = 0.5. The expected energy use is
thus E[etotal, R] = (1000 + 600) · 0.5 Wh = 800 Wh. With
E[etotal, L] > E[etotal, R], the algorithm chooses the right path.
Now let us assume that the true terrain condition both on
the left and the right sides of the crater is difficult. The left
path (wp0 → wp1 → wp4) will require 1200 Wh to tra-
verse, therefore a rover relying on the PHM algorithm will
fall 100 Wh short and will not reachwp4. A rover relying on
the DM algorithm will expend only 1000 Wh (scenario R1),
arriving at wp4 with 100 Wh in reserve.
It may be suggested that the issues with the PHM ap-
proach could be eliminated if access to a precomputed oper-
ational policy piDM is provided. However, even if such a pol-
icy was available, that would still be insufficient. If, at time
t, p(EOL) is computed using piDM, then at+1,SHM is taken on
the basis of p(EOL), p(EOL) could immediately become in-
valid unless T (st, at+1,SHM, st+1) = T (st, at+1,DM, st+1).
5 Unifying DM and SHM
This section discusses the benefits of a unified DM/SHM ap-
proach and outlines some of the key implementation details.
5.1 Separated vs. unified DM/SHM
The next example illustrates how unification can be helpful
in balancing system health needs and operational objectives:
wp0
Zone 1 Zone 2
wp1 wp2drive (4h) drive (4h)
activities (2/4h)recharge (0/4h?)
Figure 6: Separated vs. unified DM/SHM (Example 3)
Example 3. The rover starts at wp0 in Zone 1 (Figure 6)
with 500 Wh in the battery (out of the 1500 Wh capacity).
The solar panels can charge the battery at a rate of 250 W.
Sunlight in Zone 1 will last for another 12 hours.
Two actions are available in the initial state s0 at wp0
(Figure 7): skip charging (a1 = +0 Wh) and charge to
full (a2 = +1000 Wh). In Figure 7, the unitless numbers
are Watt-hours of energy going in or out of the battery.
Time (in hours) at each state is denoted as ’[t] h’.
s0
(p=0.5)
s5 s6
s9 s10
−200
200
500
a1 a2
s1 s2
s3 s4
s7 s8
s11 s12
400
(p=0.5)
+0 +1000
−200 −200
+100 +200
0 h 4 h
8 h
12 h
16 h14 h12 h
10 h
4 h
6 h 8 h
(p=0.5)
+200
(p=0.5)
+100
10 h
−200 −1000 −1800
−300300
Figure 7: Execution scenarios in Example 3
The rover needs to perform a 2-hour stationary sci-
ence activity at wp1 and be able to arrive at wp2, the
next recharge point. The prior probability of the activity
at wp1 needing to be redone (a 2-hour delay) is 0.5. Sci-
ence payload power consumption is 100 W, resulting in a
net-positive (250 W − 200 W = +50 W) power flow.
The driving times from wp0 to wp1 and from wp1 to
wp2 are 4 hours, with the average drive train power con-
sumption of 300 W, resulting in a net-negative (250 W −
300 W = −50 W) power flow.
If operating without sunlight, a 150 W heater needs
to be used to keep batteries and electronics warm, thus
resulting in a net-negative power flow of −300 W −
150 W = −450 W for driving and −200 W − 150 W =
−350 W for stationary science activities.
According to the general SHM policy of restoring health
(battery charge, in this case) to nominal, the action chosen
at wp0 is pishm(s0) = a2 and the battery is recharged to
full 1500 Wh. After the science activity at w1 is completed,
assessment is made that it needs to be repeated. The 2-hour
delay means that the entirety of wp1 → wp2 segment needs
to be done without sunlight, resulting in a complete battery
depletion before wp2 is reached, with a deficit of 300 Wh.
In computing a unified policy, however, where SHM ac-
tions are considered in the context of the overall mission, all
four scenarios depicted in Figure 7 would play a role. The
expected amount of battery charge remaining if a1 is cho-
sen would be Q1 = 0.5 · 200 + 0.5 · 300 = 250. For a2:
Q2 = 0.5 ·400+0.5 ·(−300) = 50. Action a1 (no recharge)
would be chosen and, with the two-hour delay at wp1, the
rover would arrive at wp2 with 300 Wh still remaining.
The example illustrates the first benefit of unifying DM
and SHM: the ability to naturally take operational objectives
and constraints into account when making a system health
recovery decision. The next example illustrates how DM, on
the other hand, can benefit from unified action spaces and
access to health-related models:
Example 4. The rover is traveling from wp0 to wp1 (flat
terrain) when a decision is made at point A to make a de-
tour and attempt data collection at a scientifically valuable
wp0 wp1
wp2
1-hour delay
A
B
Figure 8: Unified action spaces (Example 4)
wp2, requiring a 6-hour climb up a steep hill (Figure 8).
The 1-hour data collection activity at wp2 must be com-
pleted before the loss of illumination there in 10 hours.
After completing the 2-hour climb up to point B (1/3
of the way up), it is observed that the internal temperature
of one of the drive motors has risen to Tm = 60◦ C from
the nominal of 20◦C. At Tm = 80◦C there is a significant
risk of permanent damage and failure of the motor.
If the SHM system on the rover consists of the traditional
fault detection, diagnosis, and mitigation/recovery compo-
nents only, it may diagnose the fault to be increased friction,
mark the component (motor) as faulty, and set a constraint
on terrain types to either flat or downhill. It would then in-
voke the recommended action for this fault from ASHM: stop
and cool down (until Tm = 20◦ C).
If a prognostic component is present, it may predict that at
the current temperature increase rate, the RUL of the motor
is 1 hour (with 4 hours of climb remaining to reach wp2).
The same mitigation action (stop and cool down) would be
initiated and the same constraint on the current to the motor
(and, thus, on the incline angle) may be set. After Tm re-
turns to nominal (which happens to take 1 hour), control is
returned to DM. Based on the new constraints and the motor
marked as faulty, DM would command the rover to abort the
detour, return to A, and resume the drive to wp2.
If, however, DM had stop and cool down as part of its
action space (ADM) and updated the state variables for the
affected motor with the newly computed heat-up and cool
down rates, an operational policy could be computed that
optimizes the duration of driving and cool down intervals
and allows the rover to reach wp2 in time. For instance, if
the rover drives for two hours, then stops for an hour to cool
down the motor, it can still reachwp2 in 2+1+2+1+2 = 8
hours. With the science activity taking 1 hour, there would
still be an hour in reserve before the loss of sunlight at wp2.
5.2 Unification approach
In proposing the unified DM/SHM approach, we rely heav-
ily on utility theory (Fishburn 1970). The following, in our
opinion, are the key ingredients for a successful unification:
(1) a state-based system modeling framework and (2) a util-
ity (value) function capturing the operational preferences for
the system. A utility function (denoted as U ) captures, nu-
merically, our preferences over the space of possible out-
comes. For instance, we may assign a higher utility value
to a rover state where a desired scientific location has been
reached. Utility can be defined for system states or for state-
action pairs. If, in some system state s, the outcome of an
action a (a particular state s′) is not guaranteed, then the ex-
pected utility of the (s, a) tuple is
U(s, a) =
∑
s′
T (s′, a, s)U(s′). (2)
In a strictly deterministic system, where a plan {a0:H} up
to a horizon H can be provided ahead of time, the expected
utility of s relative to the plan is:
Ua0:H (s) =
∑
i=0:H
R(si, ai). (3)
For systems with action outcome uncertainty, the expected
utility associated with executing a policy pi for t steps from
state s can be computed recursively as
Upit (s) = R(s, pi(s)) + γ
∑
s′
T (s, pi(s), s′)Upit−1(s
′), (4)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor that is sometimes
used to bias towards earlier rewards, particularly in infinite
horizon problems (t → ∞). The optimal utility for a state
can then also be computed recursively using
U∗t (s) = max
a∈A
(R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
T (s, a, s′)U∗t−1(s
′)), (5)
which for t → ∞ becomes the Bellman equation (Bellman
1957). Knowing the optimal utility function, we can derive
an optimal policy:
pi∗(s) = arg max
a∈A
(R(s, a)+γ
∑
s′
T (s, a, s′)U∗(s′)). (6)
In problems with state uncertainty, beliefs b ∈ B can take
the place of states in equations 4–6 (Kaelbling, Littman, and
Cassandra 1998). The Markov property is assumed, mean-
ing that T (s, a, s′) does not depend on the sequence of tran-
sitions that led to s (Kemeny and Snell 1983).
Now that the foundational concepts have been described,
we will focus on those most relevant to the proposed unifi-
cation: states and the reward function R(s, a). States can be
vector quantities (Section 2). For real-world problems, the
relevant elements of the operating environment are some-
times included in the state vector, either explicitly or im-
plicitly (Ragi and Chong 2014). For instance, the rover state
vector would certainly need to include the rover’s x and y
coordinates, but may also include time t. These three ele-
ments allow us to indirectly access other information about
the environment, e.g., solar illumination, ambient tempera-
ture, communications coverage, and terrain properties.
Similarly, health-related elements can be included in the
same state vector. For the rover, the battery charge would
likely be in it already for operational purposes. Adding bat-
tery temperature, however, would allow for better reason-
ing about the state of battery health, when combined with
information on ambient temperature, terrain, and recharge
current. Thus, including even a few health-related elements
in the state vector may have a multiplicative effect on the
amount of information available. The resulting size of the
state vector may also end up being smaller than the sum of
separately maintained DM and SHM state vectors, as redun-
dant elements are eliminated.
The reward function R(s, a) encodes the costs and the
rewards of being in a particular state or taking a particular
action in a state and can also be thought of as a local util-
ity function. For many realistic problems with multi-variable
state representations, the reward function needs to combine
costs or rewards pertinent to state components. Several ap-
proaches have been proposed (Keeney and Raiffa 1993),
with additive decomposition being an effective option in
many cases. However it is implemented, the key property of
the function is that by mapping multiple variables to a single
number, it allows us to compute U(s) or U(s, a) and trans-
late a potentially complex DM formulation into an abstract
utility maximization problem.
As an example of such mapping, consider two different
rover states: s1, where the rate of battery discharge is higher
than nominal due to a parasitic load in the electrical system
and s2, where the rover is healthy, but is traversing difficult
terrain, thus also leading to a higher rate of battery discharge.
The utilities U(s1) and U(s2) may end up being approxi-
mately equal, however, given the similar impact of the two
issues on future rewards. Policies computed for s1, s2, and
their follow-on states may be similar also and, for instance,
could result in more frequent recharge stops.
One notable consequence of health-related components
being integrated into a common state vector is that from the
computational point of view the concepts of fault and fail-
ure become somewhat superfluous. If subsets Sfault ⊂ S or
Sfailure ⊂ S are defined for the system, the framework de-
scribed above will not do anything differently for them. The
only essential subset of S is ST (the terminal states). Fail-
ure states may be part of ST if they result in termination of
system operations; however, goal (success states) are mem-
bers of ST also. The only difference between them is in their
U(s) values. As long as a component fault or a failure does
not lead to a transition to a terminal state, actions that maxi-
mize the expected value of that state will be selected (which,
as it happens, implements the “fail operational” philosophy).
We will refer to this unified approach as health-aware de-
cision making (HADM). The rest of the major SHM con-
cepts are incorporated into the new approach as follows.
Fault detection and diagnostics are subsumed in belief
estimation and updating, although these operations are, of
course, used for nominal belief states as well. Uncertainty
management can now be purposefully incorporated into the
decision making process by either augmenting A with in-
formation gathering actions (Spaan, Veiga, and Lima 2015),
evaluated in the same context as other types of actions, or
by continuing to improve U(s) or U(s, a) estimates until a
desired level of confidence in them is reached (Browne and
Powley 2012). For actively controlled systems, predictive
simulations are simply an integral part of U(s) calculation,
where T (s, a, s′) serves as a one-step “prognostic” function
(with degradation models, if any). Whereas prognostic al-
gorithms applied to controlled systems are limited in their
predictive ability due to the lack of knowledge about future
actions, here the U(s) calculation process is an exploration
of possible execution scenarios, thus combining s′ or b′ es-
timation with sequential action selection.
The overall HADM operational loop (assuming state and
Plant
Figure 9: The main loop of health-aware decision making
outcome uncertainty) can be seen in Figure 9. Once the ini-
tial belief b0 is estimated at time t0, either an offline policy
is referenced or an online policy is computed to determine
a∗0 (best action). The action is executed by the plant, transi-
tioning to a new (hidden) state, and generating an observa-
tion o0. The observation is then used to update b0 (typically
through some form of Bayesian updating) and the process
repeats until a terminal state is believed to be reached.
A detailed discussion of the actual algorithms that can
implement the proposed approach is left for future publi-
cations, however examples of DM algorithms that can deal
with state or outcome uncertainty are provided by Kochen-
derfer (2015). In systems where both state and outcome un-
certainty are not a factor, a variety of traditional state space
planning algorithms (Ghallab, Nau, and Traverso 2016)
would not need any modification to produce plans for spaces
of state vectors that include health-related components.
5.3 Emergency response vs. health management
For realistic complex systems operating in the presence of
state and outcome uncertainty, S, B, and O are likely to
be infinitely large (with |A|  ∞, although still poten-
tially large). The problem of finding exact optimal policies in
such cases is PSPACE-complete (Papadimitriou and Tsitsik-
lis 1987). Approximate solution methods typically work on-
line, constructing pi for the current belief b based on beliefs
reachable from b within the decision horizon (Browne and
Powley 2012). They also typically perform targeted sam-
pling from S/B, A, and O, thus optimality guarantees can
be harder to provide. We, therefore, propose the following:
• That system emergency response (SER) be defined as
an automated or semi-automated process that is invoked
to maximize the likelihood of preserving the system’s in-
tegrity, regardless of the effect on operational goals (i.e.,
a different objective from HADM).
• That emergency response policy piSER be computed sepa-
rately from the HADM policy.
In the space domain, an example of SER is putting a space-
craft in a safe mode until the emergency is resolved (Ras-
mussen 2008). In aviation, it could be executing recom-
mendations of a collision avoidance system (Kochender-
fer 2015). Introduction of a separate SER system would
likely require the introduction of SSER, an additional S sub-
set which defines for which states piSER is invoked ver-
sus piHADM. Once again, however, SSER will not necessar-
ily only contain system fault and failure states. For instance,
states where environmental conditions warrant emergency
response (e.g., solar activity interrupting teleoperation of the
rover) would be included as well. Since the scope of the SER
problem is likely to be much narrower than that of HADM,
it opens up the possibility of computing, verifying, and val-
idating piSER offline (Kochenderfer 2015).
As sensors, computing capabilities, and DM algorithms
improve further, the fraction of the system’s state space that
is under the purview of SER will decrease. Still, we fore-
see the need for a “safety net” SER to be there for safety-
critical functions and thus advocate SER independence. SER
would cover the situations where the primary HADM system
may not be able to produce a suitable solution in a desired
amount of time, serving as an equivalent of human reflex-
ive responses triggered by important stimuli versus the more
deliberative cognitive functionality of the brain. It could also
provide dissimilar redundancy for critical regions of S, es-
sentially implementing the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason
1990), which advocates multiple different layers of protec-
tion for important functions.
5.4 Remarks on computational complexity
A counter-argument to the unified approach can be made
that it increases the computational complexity by operating
on larger S/B, A, and O spaces. While this is indeed a con-
cern, algorithms have been developed in the recent years that
can effectively accommodate much of the complexity, even
for problems with state and outcome uncertainty, by approx-
imating optimal policies online (Silver and Veness 2010;
Browne and Powley 2012). Secondly, some of the complex-
ity is removed from HADM into an independent SER com-
ponent, making the former problem easier. Finally, as noted
above, unifying the SHM and DM elements may also result
in reduction of overlapping model variables.
6 Conclusions
This paper reexamines the prevalent approach to perform-
ing system health management and makes the case for why
keeping system health management functions separate from
decision making functions can be inefficient and/or ineffec-
tive. We also present the case for why prognostics is only
meaningful in a limited set of circumstances and, even then,
needs to be driven by decision making requirements.
We then explain the rationale for unifying (not just in-
tegrating) system health management with decision making
and outline an approach for accomplishing that. We also pro-
pose keeping emergency response functionality separate to
guarantee timely response, provide dissimilar redundancy,
and allow for offline computation, validation, and verifica-
tion of emergency response policies.
We believe that the proposed unification approach will
improve the performance of both decision making and sys-
tem health management, while potentially simplifying in-
formational architectures, reducing sensor suite sizes, and
combining modeling efforts. The approach is scalable with
respect to system complexity and the types of uncertainties
present. It also puts a variety of existing and emerging com-
putational methods at the disposal of system designers.
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